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SECOND THOUGHTS ON RUSTv. SULLIVAN AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Preliminary comment on Rust v. Sullivan has expressed serious
misgivings on its first amendment implications. The majority of
comment has suggested that Rust is in error, even as the dissent
suggested, as a violation offreedom of speech. It is less clear to me
than it is to others that either the dissent or the critics are correct. 1
I have modeled the following comparison to try to gain some distance from the problem. The effort is to propose a rival case (and
have the reader judge the adequacy of the comparison to his or her
own critical satisfaction). Here is the comparison I want to suggest.
1. Suppose the Supreme Court has held that while a state law
forbidding "child abuse" as ordinarily understood (to forbid varieties of harsh treatment of one's child) is valid as against a parental
claim of right to provide for the rearing and discipline of his or her
own child as he or she thinks best, and the Court has also held that
the fourteenth amendment does protect a parent's interest in respect
to the care, discipline, control, and rearing of children to the extent
that the mere spanking of one's own child in one's own home cannot be criminalized by the state.2
2. Suppose Congress funds "family counseling" centers as
part of its concern with the terrible general problem of poor child
care in America, and that these centers will operate in much the
same fashion as Title X projects currently do. Let us call these Title
XI projects.
3. Suppose the question arises in Congress, in drafting the
family counseling assistance act, whether there should be any limitations on eligibility for federal funds, and it is quickly resolved that
1. There were other issues also presented in Rust, of course. The O'Connor dissent
seemed to me well reasoned (that the Court should not have deemed the restrictive regulation
to be consistent with the act under the circumstances, notwithstanding Chevron), but here I
am not seeking agreement or comment on that point. Rather, I want to eliminate that kind of
issue to examine the more basic criticism that has been ventured of the case (i.e., that assuming the regulation were exactly faithful to the act of Congress then the act as applied is invalid
under Roe and under the first amendment, contrary to the position taken by Rehnquist for
five members of the Court).
2. I need not elaborate the foundation for that opinion here, but it would have strong
grounding in a number of family privacy cases-from Meyer, Skinner, Yoder, Griswold,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, etc.-that suggest a fundamental right to have children and
direct their upbringing at home as a parent, consistent with reasonable limitations essential
for their fair protection.
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there should be-that not just any kind of "counselling" is worthy
of federal tax support. While recognizing that parents may have a
constitutional right (so to speak)J to spank their own children, and
while recognizing that some child psychologists believe that there
are circumstances in which spanking is the preferred course for a
parent to pursue, Congress nevertheless concludes that the use of
spanking is nothing taxpayers should be asked to support.
The case that emerges, then, is essentially this: federal funds
are available on application to help defray expenses in operating
local family counseling centers willing and interested in providing
counselling on affirmative means of child rearing, but exclusive of
"aversive" conditioning as a means of child rearing~ounselling
the use of spanking cannot be provided by a Title XI project. A
grant applicant acknowledges that the counselling it believes to be
suitable to provide those seeking its services must include counselling inclusive of spanking. In its view, moreover, and in the view of
the child psychologists it uses in its facilities, failure to mention
spanking as a parentally responsible action would be professionally
irresponsible.4 Unable (or unwilling) to limit its counselling exclusive of such advice, its application for becoming a Title XI project is
returned as failing the eligibility limitations Congress has expressly
provided.
One may modify this case to bring it more nearly parallel to
Rust v. Sullivan. One may do this by supposing that a Title XI
project is not itself a "family counseling" agency as such; rather, it
is an agency that will furnish a list of family counseling agencies,
but, to be eligible for federal funds, insofar as Congress does not
approve of spanking children, the list an agency receiving federal
funds uses in its capacity as a Title XI projects may not include
counseling agencies that recommend spanking as among the alternatives parents should consider as appropriate to do. (Actually,
this is not a very subtle hypothetical. Rather, it has been selected
3. Actually, not a "right" in the correct sense, but rather a "liberty" they may exercise
within limits otherwise validly set by each state (pursuant to its anti-child-abuse laws).
4. Of course, it also concedes that not everyone agrees that counselling spanking is
either necessary or desirable-it concedes (as it must) that there is a range and difference of
opinion among professionals as among lay persons as well. Still, it holds firmly to its view
that such persons are seriously mistaken and not really competent psychologists; in its view,
no competent psychologist would fail to urge spanking at least in some circumstances. On
the other hand, it also acknowledges (as it must) that while the Supreme Court has upheld
parental rights (including spanking), the Court has never suggested that a parent has some
kind of constitutional "duty" to use spanking.
5. Such lists the same agency may provide elsewhere, on the other hand, may of course
include agencies that do encourage the use of child spanking (i.e., nothing in confining its
activity as a Title XI project in any way requires that it alter or abandon any other service or
activity it is cu"ently engaged in).
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merely to gain distance and perspective on the basic issue. I choose
"spanking" rather than "abortion" because not all who feel deeply
about abortion may feel equally deeply about the right to spank-or
the unconstitutionality of legislation limiting tax support money to
agencies not making referrals to those who will counsel the desirability of spanking.)
To stimulate some interest in this comparison, I sent a few preview copies to a few first amendment buffs for their own first reaction. Geoffrey Stone sent back the following provocative response,
which with his permission is republished here. Perhaps others will
see alternative ways of sorting it out as well. What does one think is
the key?6
William W. VanAlstyne 1

•••••
Dear Bill:
Thanks for sending me your mock problem concerning Rust
v. Sullivan. It is, indeed, intriguing. Let me, however, pose a
counter hypothetical.
Suppose the government decides to provide legal assistance
for poor but non-indigent criminal defendants. Suppose also that
attorneys who are funded through this program must agree not
to inform their clients of their right to exclude evidence under
the fourth amendment. I suggest that this hypothetical also
duplicates Rust, but that our intuitions in this hypothetical run
in exactly the opposite direction from your hypothetical.
I can think of two possible explanations. First, it may be
that we "rank" the constitutional rights at issue in these situations as follows: 1. fourth amendment, 2. abortion, 3. spanking.
Thus, we think it legitimate for the government to discourage
spanking, illegitimate for the government to discourage enforcement of the exclusionary rule, and we are apparently divided
over whether it is legitimate for the government to discourage
abortion (an issue, however, that has been resolved for us by the
Supreme Court in Harris and Maher). The problem with this
6. Is there a denial of equal protection to the ineligible applicant? (But no one is made
ineligible because of who they are, rather, they are ineligible only to the extent that they
would admittedly presume to spend the funds for which they make application in a manner
no applicant would be permitted to do. And if that is so, wherein does the denial of equal
protection of the Jaw, differentiating them from anyone else, inhere?) Is it, rather, that the
restriction abridges the constitutional rights of parents (to spank their children)? (But no
sanction is threatened by this law for any such activity, so wherein is the infringement of that
right?)
7. William & Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
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explanation, of course, is that it would seem to return us to the
realm of "preferred freedoms."
A second explanation, suggested to me by Elena Kagan, one
of my younger colleagues, is that the difference lies in our intuitions about the extent to which the "counselor" in each of the
three situations would effectively determine the individual's decisions for him or her. In the spanking hypothetical we know that
individuals are well aware of the option of spanking. The mere
fact that it is not recommended by a family counselling advisor
would not seriously interfere with the individual's opportunity to
exercise the right. In the abortion context, people are well aware
of the right to abortion, but they may place more weight on the
advice they receive from a family planning advisor because the
decisions involved are so much more difficult. Finally, in the defense counsel hypothetical, it's clear that individual defendants
will have little knowledge of their constitutional rights and will
therefore make their decisions almost entirely on the advice they
receive from their attorneys. Hence, our intuitions may be explained by the extent to which we think the government is effectively "trumping" the individual's decisions about the exercise of
these rights.
In any event, that's the best I can do at the moment.
Sincerely yours,
Geoffrey R. Stone

